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God Knows the True Future: Ockhamism

  • Ciro De FlorioEmail author
  • Aldo Frigerio
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion book series (PFPR)

Abstract

This chapter is devoted to Ockhamism. We present the main ingredients of this theory: the concepts of true future and soft fact. Then, we provide a semantics that characterizes the Ockhamist view. In the critical part, we scrutinize the notion of soft fact and we advance an argument against the compatibility of Ockhamism and Presentism.

Keywords

Ockhamism Thin red line Soft fact Presentism 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversità Cattolica del Sacro CuoreMilanItaly

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