Impure Public Good Models as a Tool to Analyze the Provision of Ancillary and Primary Benefits

  • Anja BrummeEmail author
  • Wolfgang Buchholz
  • Dirk Rübbelke
Part of the Springer Climate book series (SPCL)


Climate policies regularly have various effects of different degrees of publicness. Therefore, they constitute so-called impure public “goods.” Cornes and Sandler (Econ J 94:580–598, 1984) developed the standard approach to analyze such goods, which combines elements of Lancaster’s (J Polit Econ 74:132–157, 1966) characteristics approach and the rationing literature. The impure public goods approach has been extended in many respects in recent years and was applied to fields as diverse as climate protection, military alliances, agricultural research, terrorism, and performing arts. Yet, the complexity of the analysis often makes it difficult to observe the mechanisms that work in the context of impure public good provision and this chapter concludes that a further development of analysis tools is desirable in order to facilitate the understanding of the very important category of impure public goods.


Impure public goods Ancillary benefits Comparative static analysis Points rationing Virtual magnitudes 


  1. Andreoni J (1989) Giving with impure altruism: applications to charity and Ricardian equivalence. J Polit Econ 97:1447–1458CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Atkinson SE, Sandler T, Tschirhart J (1987) Terrorism in a bargaining framework. J Law Econ 30:1–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Auld DAL, Eden L (1990) Public characteristics of non-public goods. Public Financ 3:378–391Google Scholar
  4. Bahn O, Leach A (2008) The secondary benefits of climate change mitigation: an overlapping generations approach. Comput Manag Sci 5:233–257CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Baumol WJ (1982) Applied fairness theory and rationing policy. Am Econ Rev 72:639–651Google Scholar
  6. Baumol WJ, Bowen WG (1966) Performing arts: the economic dilemma. Twentieth Century Fund, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  7. Becker GS (1974) A theory of social interactions. J Polit Econ 82:1063–1093CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Betts A (2003) Public goods theory and the provision of refugee protection: the role of the joint-product model in burden-sharing theory. J Refug Stud 16:274–296CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Booth A (1985) Economists and points rationing in the Second World War. J Eur Econ Hist 14:299Google Scholar
  10. Brumme A, Buchholz W, Rübbelke D (2019) Impure public goods and the aggregative game approach. In: Buchholz W, Markandya A, Rübbelke D, Vögele S (eds) Ancillary benefits of climate policy—new theoretical developments and empirical findings. Springer, Berlin, pp 141–155Google Scholar
  11. Buchholz W, Peters W (2001) The overprovision anomaly of private public good supply. J Econ 74:6378CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Buchholz W, Cornes R, Rübbelke D (2018) Public goods and public bads. J Public Econ Theory 20:525–540CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Chan NW (2019) Funding global environmental public goods through multilateral financial mechanisms. Environ Resour Econ 73:515–531CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Chan NW, Kotchen MJ (2014) A generalized impure public good and linear characteristics model of green consumption. Resour Energy Econ 37:1–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Cornes R (1996) Points rationing: applications and analysis, Keele University (unpublished manuscript)Google Scholar
  16. Cornes R (2016) Aggregative environmental games. Environ Resour Econ 63:339–365CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Cornes R, Hartley R (2007) Aggregative public good games. J Public Econ Theory 9:201–219CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Cornes R, Sandler T (1984) Easy riders, joint production, and public goods. Econ J 94:580–598CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Cornes R, Sandler T (1994) The comparative static properties of the impure public good model. J Public Econ 54:403–421CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Cornes R, Sandler T (1996) The theory of externalities, public goods and club goods, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, New YorkCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Corradini M, Costantini V, Mancinelli S, Mazzanti M (2015) Interacting innovation investments and environmental performances: a dynamic impure public good model. Environ Econ Policy Stud 17:109–129CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. de Graaff JV (1948) Towards an austerity theory of value 1. S Afr J Econ 16:35–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Gorman WM (1980) A possible procedure for analysing quality differentials in the egg market. Rev Econ Stud 47:843–856CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Hoyos D (2010) The state of the art of environmental valuation with discrete choice experiments. Ecol Econ 69:1595–1603CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Khanna J, Huffman WE, Sandler T (1994) Agricultural research expenditures in the United States: a public goods perspective. Rev Econ Stat 76:267–277CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Kingma BR, McClelland R (1995) Public radio stations are really, really not public goods: charitable contributions and impure altruism. Ann Public Coop Econ 66:65–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Kotchen MJ (2005) Impure public goods and the comparative statics of environmentally friendly consumption. J Environ Econ Manag 49:281–300CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Kotchen MJ (2007) Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in impure public good models. Econ Lett 97:91–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Kotchen MJ (2009) Voluntary provision of public goods for bads: a theory of environmental offsets. Econ J 119:883–899CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Lancaster K (1966) A new approach to consumer theory. J Polit Econ 74:132–157CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Lancaster K (1971) Consumer demand: a new approach. Columbia studies in economics, vol 5. Columbia University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  32. Lee DR, Sandler T (1989) On the optimal retaliation against terrorists: the paid-rider option. Public Choice 61:141–152CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Leonard T (2016) Housing upkeep and public good provision in residential neighborhoods. Hous Policy Debate 26:888–908CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Lloyd EMH (1942) Some notes on point rationing. Rev Econ Stat 24:49–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Maikovich AK (2005) A new understanding of terrorism using cognitive dissonance principles. J Theory Soc Behav 35:373–397CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Markandya A, Rübbelke D (2012) Impure public technologies and environmental policy. J Econ Stud 39:128–143CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Munro A, Valente M (2016) Green goods: are they good or bad news for the environment? Evidence from a laboratory experiment on impure public goods. Environ Resour Econ 65:317–335CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Muth RF (1966) Household production and consumer demand functions. Econometrica 34:699–708CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Neary JP, Roberts KWS (1980) The theory of household behaviour under rationing. Eur Econ Rev 13:25–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Pittel K, Rübbelke D (2017) Thinking local but acting global? The interplay between local and global internalization of externalities. In: Buchholz W, Rübbelke D (eds) The theory of externalities and public goods: essays in memory of Richard C. Springer, Cham, pp 271–297CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Posnett J, Sandler T (1986) Joint supply and the finance of charitable activity. Public Financ Q 14:209–222CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Pugliese T, Wagner J (2011) Competing impure public goods and the sustainability of the theater arts. Econ Bull 31:1295–1303Google Scholar
  43. Rive N, Rübbelke D (2010) International environmental policy and poverty alleviation. Rev World Econ 146:515–543CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Rothbarth E (1941) The measurement of changes in real income under conditions of rationing. Rev Econ Stud 8:100–107CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. Rübbelke D (2002) International climate policy to combat global warming: an analysis of the ancillary benefits of reducing carbon emissions. Edward Elgar, CheltenhamGoogle Scholar
  46. Rübbelke D (2003) An analysis of differing abatement incentives. Resour Energy Econ 25:269–294CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  47. Rübbelke D (2005) Differing motivations for terrorism. Def Peace Econ 16:19–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Rübbelke D (2006) Analysis of an international environmental matching agreement. Environ Econ Policy Stud 8:1–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Sandler T (1996) A game-theoretic analysis of carbon emissions. In: Congleton RD (ed) The political economy of environmental protection: analysis and evidence. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp 251–272Google Scholar
  50. Sandler T (2013) Public goods and regional cooperation for development: a new look. Int Trade J 36:13–24Google Scholar
  51. Sandler T (2017) International peacekeeping operations: burden sharing and effectiveness. J Confl Resolut 61:1875–1897CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  52. Sandler T, Arce M DG (2002) A conceptual framework for understanding global and transnational public goods for health. Fisc Stud 23:195–222CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  53. Sandler T, Hartley K (2001) Economics of alliances: the lessons for collective action. J Econ Lit 39:869–896CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  54. Sandler T, Murdoch JC (2000) On sharing NATO defence burdens in the 1990s and beyond. Fisc Stud 21:297–327CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  55. Sandmo A (1973) Public goods and the technology of consumption. Rev Econ Stud 40:517–528CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  56. Schwirplies C, Ziegler A (2016) Offset carbon emissions or pay a price premium for avoiding them? A cross-country analysis of motives for climate protection activities. Appl Econ 48:746–758CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  57. Singer HW (1941) The German war economy in the light of economic periodicals. Econ J 51:192–215CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  58. Tobin J (1952) A survey of the theory of rationing. Econometrica 20:521–553CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  59. Tobin J, Houthakker HS (1950) The effects of rationing on demand elasticities. Rev Econ Stud 18:140–153CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  60. Vicary S (1997) Joint production and the private provision of public goods. J Public Econ 63:429–445CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  61. Vicary S (2000) Donations to a public good in a large economy. Eur Econ Rev 44:609–618CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  62. Vicary S, Sandler T (2002) Weakest-link public goods: giving in-kind or transferring money. Eur Econ Rev 46:1501–1520CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anja Brumme
    • 1
    Email author
  • Wolfgang Buchholz
    • 2
  • Dirk Rübbelke
    • 1
  1. 1.Technische Universität Bergakademie FreibergFreibergGermany
  2. 2.University of RegensburgRegensburgGermany

Personalised recommendations