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Self-Feeling pp 149-160 | Cite as

How This Account of Self-Feeling Contributes to Today’s Debates

  • Gerhard Kreuch
Chapter
Part of the Contributions to Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 107)

Abstract

We saw in part I of this book that there are many challenges in contemporary philosophy of self-consciousness. The account of self-feeling presented in this book attempts to contribute to these problems. First, it avoids the problems of reflective theories, namely infinite regress and vicious circularity. Second, it overcomes the “ex negativo” challenge that alternative, current pre-reflective theories suffer from. Moreover, chapter “ Self-Feeling and Unity” will further explore the problem of unity. In addition to the problems of philosophy of self-consciousness, this account of self-feeling contributes to philosophy of human affectivity by complementing the theory of existential feelings.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerhard Kreuch
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ViennaViennaAustria

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