On Practical Aspects of Coercion-Resistant Remote Voting Systems

  • Kristjan Krips
  • Jan WillemsonEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11759)


Coercive behaviour is hard to control in the remote electronic voting setting. This is why a number of protocols have been proposed that aim at mitigating this threat. However, these proposals have remained largely academic. This paper takes the practical viewpoint and analyses the most common assumptions that are required by the various schemes, together with the exact level of coercion-resistance they provide.



The research leading to these results has received funding from the Estonian Research Council under Institutional Research Grant IUT27-1 and the European Regional Development Fund through the Estonian Centre of Excellence in ICT Research (EXCITE) and the grant number EU48684.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Cybernetica ASTartuEstonia
  2. 2.STACCTartuEstonia
  3. 3.Institute of Computer ScienceUniversity of TartuTartuEstonia

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