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System-on-Chip Security Vulnerabilities

  • Farimah Farahmandi
  • Yuanwen Huang
  • Prabhat Mishra
Chapter

Abstract

Modern System-on-Chip (SoC) designs contain several highly sensitive assets such as encryption keys, device configurations, and on-device protected data that are responsible for keeping our personal, financial, and intimate physiological information safe and secure. These assets should be protected from any unauthorized access. Attacks on hardware can harm human life and environment by causing damages to critical infrastructure, violating personal privacy, or undermining the credibility of a business. Trust establishment in semiconductor designs has become a major challenge for design houses since several countries and companies are involved during different stages of a design life cycle. Vulnerabilities can be introduced during different design stages (such as defining specification, implementing designs at different abstraction levels, layout extraction, or during manufacturing). In this chapter, we review the modern semiconductor supply chain and provide an overview of SoC security vulnerabilities and their sources.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Farimah Farahmandi
    • 1
  • Yuanwen Huang
    • 2
  • Prabhat Mishra
    • 1
  1. 1.University of FloridaGainesvilleUSA
  2. 2.GoogleMountain ViewUSA

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