Social Cost Guarantees in Smart Route Guidance

  • Paolo SerafinoEmail author
  • Carmine Ventre
  • Long Tran-Thanh
  • Jie Zhang
  • Bo An
  • Nick Jennings
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11671)


We model and study the problem of assigning traffic in an urban road network infrastructure. In our model, each driver submits their intended destination and is assigned a route to follow that minimizes the social cost (i.e., travel distance of all the drivers). We assume drivers are strategic and try to manipulate the system (i.e., misreport their intended destination and/or deviate from the assigned route) if they can reduce their travel distance by doing so. Such strategic behavior is highly undesirable as it can lead to an overall suboptimal traffic assignment and cause congestion. To alleviate this problem, we develop moneyless mechanisms that are resilient to manipulation by the agents and offer provable approximation guarantees on the social cost obtained by the solution. We then empirically test the mechanisms studied in the paper, showing that they can be effectively used in practice in order to compute manipulation resistant traffic allocations.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paolo Serafino
    • 1
    Email author
  • Carmine Ventre
    • 2
  • Long Tran-Thanh
    • 3
  • Jie Zhang
    • 3
  • Bo An
    • 4
  • Nick Jennings
    • 5
  1. 1.Gran Sasso Science InstituteL’AquilaItaly
  2. 2.University of EssexColchesterUK
  3. 3.University of SouthamptonSouthamptonUK
  4. 4.Nanyang Technological UniversitySingaporeSingapore
  5. 5.Imperial College LondonLondonUK

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