Deterrence pp 177-191 | Cite as

Anglo-American Strategic Relations, Economic Warfare and the Deterrence of Japan, 1937–1942: Success or Failure?

  • Greg KennedyEmail author
Part of the Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications book series (ASTSA)


The study of the use of deterrence as a strategic concept employed by a Great Power, or combination of Powers, has traditionally been associated almost entirely with the Cold War and the use of nuclear weapons within a containment strategy context (Freedman 2004, 2005, pp. 789–801). Therefore, like the concept of containment, deterrence has not been assessed rigorously as a viable strategic tool within the conventional conflict spectrum. Furthermore, the use of empirical historical analysis as the means of providing that assessment has also been absent from considerations regarding the utility of deterrence in the modern international security environment. Finally, deterrence has most often been associated with the threat of the use of military power being the mechanism by which changed or deterred behaviour is achieved (Gaddis 2005; Heuser 1998, pp. 311–328; Tarock 2016, pp. 1408–1424; Milevski 2016). Through an analysis of British and American economic and fiscal policies from 1937 to 1941, aimed at deterring Japan from disrupting the balance of power system in place in the Far East that protected their imperial possessions in the region, a better appreciation of non-military deterrence is achieved (Lacey 2015).


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.King’s College LondonLondonUK

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