This chapter begins with Aristotle’s definition of time, in his Physics, as the number of movement, then deals with Augustine’s psychological version of time, before moving on to its consideration as duration by Bergson. It then gives the phenomenological view of time as expounded by Husserl, who considers it as objective, subjective, and transcendental, and thus as the condition of possibility of objects within the temporal flow, before tackling, finally, Heidegger’s more originary view of time as the determination of Dasein’s being-in-the-world.
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