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Economic Analysis and Anti-corruption Policies

  • Wladimir Andreff
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Pivots in Sports Economics book series (PAPISE)

Abstract

Until the emergence of globalised online betting, a standard economic analysis of sport corruption was relying on Gary Becker’s economics of crime. This model, presented in this chapter, assumes that anyone makes a cost-benefit analysis of a corrupt action before starting it up. Anti-corruption recipes are derived from the model, basically increasing the expected cost of corruption (if detected) through sanctions and lowering its utility through education. The current situation of corrupt sport is in itself exhibiting such recipes’ shortcomings. Then the debate is running these days about how improving governance in sport governing bodies. A more radical reform is called for.

Keywords

Economics of crime Cost-benefit of corruption Anti-corruption policies Sanctions Governance Reforms 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wladimir Andreff
    • 1
  1. 1.Centre d’Economie de la SorbonneUniversity Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneParisFrance

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