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Introduction

  • Maurizio MartelliniEmail author
  • Ralf Trapp
Chapter
  • 32 Downloads

Abstract

This book deals with the changing landscape of risks posed by chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNe) materials and technologies. It looks, in particular, at how advances in science and technology are changing and reshaping this risk landscape. These risks range from natural events such as major disease outbreaks to industrial, transportation and other accidents leading to the release of CBRNe materials, and to their use for hostile purposes as weapons of terror or war. The book also looks at how advances in science and technology create new opportunities for mitigating these risks, and more generally at governance strategies for the twenty-first century to manage these evolving risks. It argues that traditional approaches to WMD arms control need to be rendered flexible and adaptive to allow for the new disruptive technologies and materials that are reshaping the WMD landscape. The architecture and normative basis of the WMD arms control regimes, it concludes, should remain perpetual whilst their definitions, implementation processes and review mechanisms should be revised when necessary, synchronised with the advances in science and technology and their industrial applications.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Università degli Studi dell’InsubriaComoItaly
  2. 2.Independent Disarmament ConsultantChessenazFrance

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