Jean Améry pp 261-284 | Cite as

Between the Logic of Life and the Anti-logic of Death: Reflections on Suicidality in the Wake of Jean Améry

  • Yael Lavi


Over the last century, suicidal thoughts have usually been examined under the magnifying glass of psychologists, psychiatrists, and moralists, as a pathological phenomenon of misjudgment or failure of judgment abilities. This approach, according to Jean Améry (1912–1978), is subordinate to the logic of life, while the suicidal mind is altered by the anti-logic of death. What is the anti-logic of death? Is it a logic at all? What is its relation to death and to voluntary death? This chapter aims to investigate the meaning of the anti-logic of death and its role in Améry’s line of reasoning. I argue that a proper understanding of the role of anti-logic uncovers the way in which Améry’s reasoning is aimed to expose the absurd rebellion embodied by voluntary death.


Absurd Anti-logic Death Jean Améry Suicide Trust 


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Authors and Affiliations

  • Yael Lavi
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Philosophy, Linguistics and Science Studies, The Lester and Sally Entin Faculty of HumanitiesTel Aviv UniversityTel AvivIsrael

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