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Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur

  • Carmen WunderlichEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Norm Research in International Relations book series (NOREINRE)

Abstract

This chapter comprises the empirical core of “Rogue States as Norm Entrepreneurs,” zooming in on the arms control policies of Iran. While most scholars dismiss Iranian arms control policy as political maneuvering and propaganda instrument, Wunderlich shows that it is also norm-driven and fits the theoretical concept of norm entrepreneurship. Based on a detailed process-tracing, Wunderlich reconstructs three different instances of Iranian norm advocacy with regard to the control of weapons of mass destruction: Iran’s commitment to nuclear disarmament, its advocacy for a right to uranium enrichment as well as Iranian engagement for assistance and protection for the victims of chemical weapons. Based on a set of criteria distilled from the literature on norms, Wunderlich explores the strategies and means through which Iranian norm entrepreneurship unfolds and discusses the extent to which it differs from prototypical norm advocacy.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Political ScienceUniversity of Duisburg-EssenDuisburgGermany

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