Credit Risk

  • Andrada BilanEmail author
  • Hans Degryse
  • Kuchulain O’Flynn
  • Steven Ongena
Part of the Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions book series (SBFI)


These days banks can trade away credit risk (i.e., the risk that the loan amount will not be returned due to borrower financial distress), by using the credit default swaps (CDS) market. In this chapter, we begin by describing credit default swaps and key events in the CDS market. We then study how modern finance has affected banks credit rate risk management through the use of credit default swaps (CDS). Next we discuss the literature that seeks to uncover the externalities of the decision to hedge credit risk using CDS. In particular, we focus on how this affects other credit markets and the CDS references firms, how these referenced firms respond to having CDS traded on their debt, and, finally, how CDS trading affects non-reference firms.


Credit risk Banking Risk management Derivatives Hedging Lending CDS 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrada Bilan
    • 1
    Email author
  • Hans Degryse
    • 2
  • Kuchulain O’Flynn
    • 1
  • Steven Ongena
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Banking and FinanceUniversity of ZurichZürichSwitzerland
  2. 2.Faculty of Economics and BusinessKatholieke University of LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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