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What Are the Institutional Preconditions for a Stable Non-Nuclear Peace?

  • Harald MüllerEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies book series (RCS)

Abstract

Even with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), nuclear disarmament will be protracted. The ambition is not just a world without nuclear weapons but non-nuclear peace: the war-prevention functions of nuclear deterrence must be taken over by other means; conflicts that motivate states to possess nuclear weapons must be resolved in order to terminate these motivations. The TPNW, while contributing to a nuclear taboo, is insufficient as institutional foundation for achieving and maintaining a peaceful world without nuclear weapons. New political institutions are needed for mitigating competition among major powers, verification, compliance and enforcement. Contrary to the prevailing discourse, cultural institutions which shape the thinking about nuclear weapons are more relevant than political, military and technical institutions for achieving the final goal.

Keywords

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TNPW) Nuclear taboo Political institutions Enforcement Cultural institutions 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Goethe University FrankfurtFrankfurtGermany

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