Advertisement

Reflection

  • Gustavo Pereira
Chapter
Part of the Philosophy and Politics - Critical Explorations book series (PPCE, volume 9)

Abstract

The third articulating element of practical life is reflection, which is presented as the agents’ capacity to consider themselves from an external perspective, evaluate their own beliefs, desires and emotions, and confirm, reconfigure or reject them. This reflective exercise enables agents to evaluate their own positions and others’ through the interpersonal and intrapersonal relationships established in practical life, as well as their criticism, reformulation or confirmation. In this section, Korsgaard’s and Frankfurt’s positions are taken as starting points, and are reformulated and radicalized in intersubjectivist terms, from a perspective that is sensitive to vulnerability. In turn, reflection can be classified according to different exercise intensities, which also allows us to establish degrees of vulnerability to social pathologies. Finally, in this chapter I present the concept of normative friction as a trigger for reflective processes that can lead to the revision, transformation and criticism of beliefs, structures and social relationships, and of distinctive circumstances of social pathologies. Normative friction is a particular case of the concept of cognitive dissonance introduced by Festinger, and has its field of application in the questions of practical life, while cognitive dissonance is more comprehensive and can be experienced, for example, in the field of basic or experimental sciences.

Keywords

Self-reflection Interpersonal relationships Cognitive dissonance Frankfurt Korsgaard 

References

  1. Barvosa-Carter, Edwina. 2007. Mestiza Autonomy as a Relational Autonomy. Ambivalence and the Social Character of the Will. The Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (1): 1–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Cooper, Joel. 2007. Cognitive Dissonance: Fifty Years of a Classic Theory. London: Sage.Google Scholar
  3. Elster, Jon. 1983. Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Paris/Cambridge: Maison des Sciences de l’Homme/Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Festinger, Leon. 1962. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
  5. Frankfurt, Harry. 1998a. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. In The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays, 11–25. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  6. ———. 1998b. Identification and Wholeheartedness. In The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays, 159–176. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  7. Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.Google Scholar
  8. Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds. 1982. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristic and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Meyers, Diana T. 2000. Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self. In Relational autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, 151–180. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Modzelewski, Helena. 2017. Emociones, educación y democracia: una proyección de la teoría de las emociones de Martha Nussbaum. México: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-UNAM.Google Scholar
  12. Munro, Alice. 2009. Too Much Happiness: Stories. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.Google Scholar
  13. Pereira, Gustavo. 2009. Autonomía, intersubjetividad y consumo. Sistema 210: 53–70.Google Scholar
  14. ———. 2013. Elements of a Critical Theory of Justice. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Solomon, Robert. 2007. True to Our Feelings. What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  16. Stanovich, Keith E. 2011. Rationality and the Reflective Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  17. Taylor, Charles. 1985. What Is Human Agency? In Philosophical Papers: Human Agency and Language, Vol. 1, 15–47. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gustavo Pereira
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of HumanitiesUniversidad de la RepúblicaMontevideoUruguay

Personalised recommendations