Knowledge and Action: Self-Positing, I-Hood, and the Centrality of the Striving Doctrine
In this chapter I provide an account of self-positing and the nature of I-hood that challenges the traditional view popularized and defended by Henrich and his followers. I argue that self-positing and I-hood are the foundation for Fichte’s comprehensive theory of rational agency construed to embrace epistemic and practical agency. Accordingly, the chapter includes a sustained critique of Henrich’s (Wildt’s, Tugenhat’s, etc.) contention that Fichte’s theory of subjectivity is grounded in a view of self-positing as strictly and essentially an epistemic self-relation. I argue that self-positing should be read as free, absolute, rational self-determination underlying and underwriting all acts of the I, and that Fichte’s Jena Wissenschaftslehre is a theory of free, rational agency. Self-positing, thus, must be interpreted in light of the Fichte’s striving doctrine.