Elinor Ostrom or the Revolution of the Commons
Elinor Ostrom (1933–2012) is a revolutionary figure in the landscape of contemporary economics for several reasons. First, she is the first and still only woman ever to receive the “Nobel” Prize in Economics (or “the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel” to be entirely correct) in 2009. Secondly, she has developed innovative theoretical models that are deeply rooted in fieldwork in connection with even wider sustainability issues.
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