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Elinor Ostrom or the Revolution of the Commons

  • Fanny Verrax
Chapter

Abstract

Elinor Ostrom (1933–2012) is a revolutionary figure in the landscape of contemporary economics for several reasons. First, she is the first and still only woman ever to receive the “Nobel” Prize in Economics (or “the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel” to be entirely correct) in 2009. Secondly, she has developed innovative theoretical models that are deeply rooted in fieldwork in connection with even wider sustainability issues.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fanny Verrax
    • 1
  1. 1.LyonFrance

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