For a Foundation

  • Joshua Rasmussen


Rasmussen makes an opening case for an ultimate and necessarily existent foundation of things. He puts forward three arguments: (i) from explanation, (ii) from contingency, and (iii) from possible causes. The first argument is a reason to think that the best explanation of existence—of why anything exists—will be in terms of a necessarily existing reality. The second argument is a plurals-version of the argument from contingency. Third, Rasmussen gives a version of his argument from possible causes. This argument uses modal logic to deduce necessary existence from the possibility of a cause of events. He proposes these arguments as initial data relevant to the larger inquiry. Rasmussen closes with an assessment of a Humean objection to necessary existence.


Necessary being Argument from contingency Necessary existence Argument from possible causes 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joshua Rasmussen
    • 1
  1. 1.Azusa Pacific UniversityAzusaUSA

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