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Addiction and Responsibility

  • Michael S. MooreEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

While addiction is not a legal defense in any legal system, the chapter assays whether it should be. The conclusion is largely negative, denying that there should be any general defense but allowing that in certain cases at least a partial defense would be appropriate. The chapter rejects the shibboleths commonly asserted in this area: that no addict can be excused because he or she was responsible for becoming an addict in the first place and that all addicts must be excused because addiction is a brain disease. A more piecemeal, nuanced approach is taken to the issue.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of IllinoisChampaignUSA

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