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Real Worlds: Simulating Non-standard Rationality in Microeconomics

  • Giuliana Gerace
Chapter
Part of the Computational Social Sciences book series (CSS)

Abstract

In this chapter, the differences between the standard notion of rationality, used in neoclassical economic model, and the notion of “non-standard” rationality are highlighted. The notion of non-standard rationality has been used in an attempt to address the discrepancies found between the ideal cognitive attitudes of the homo economicus and limited rational abilities of real decision-makers. By contrast, this notion is not supported by any adequate nor exhaustive theoretical account of “non-standard” preferences and therefore doesn’t provide useful applications for real-world simulations in microeconomics.

Keywords

Rationality Conventional economics Behavioural economics Economic preferences Market simulation 

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Authors and Affiliations

  • Giuliana Gerace
    • 1
  1. 1.Università di PaviaPaviaItaly

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