Local Public Finance and Economics: Theory and the Practice—Introduction and Overview

  • Harry KitchenEmail author
  • Melville McMillan
  • Anwar Shah


This chapter serves as an introduction to this volume and to basic concepts in local governance. The chapter begins with an overview of basic concepts. It then provides a synthesis of conceptual perspectives on local government and central-local relations. A comparative analysis of local government organization and finance is also presented. Contrasting experiences of local governance in industrial and developing countries are highlighted. Conclusions of empirical evidence on the impact of localization/decentralization on good governance and growth are summarized. A final section introduces the two-volume series on local public governance and presents an overview of the contents of rest of this volume.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsTrent UniversityPeterboroughCanada
  2. 2.University of AlbertaEdmontonCanada
  3. 3.Governance StudiesBrookings InstitutionWashington, DCUSA

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