This chapter looks into the risks and new challenges posed by China, particularly by including the ASEAN countries in which the EU currently enjoys a leading position in terms of foreign direct investment, but which sooner or later will face China assuming the dominant role. This process is likely to be accelerated by the US-Sino trade conflict which, of course, has an impact on Chinese multinational companies’ foreign direct investment orientation. The broader US policy inconsistencies and the Trump Administration’s analytical shortcomings become clear here again—in line with the broader innovative view emphasized for international economic analysis, namely, that trade, foreign direct investment and tariffs plus capital accumulation have to be analyzed jointly.
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