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The Enforcement of International Law

  • Elena Kantorowicz-ReznichenkoEmail author
Chapter
Part of the United Nations University Series on Regionalism book series (UNSR, volume 17)

Abstract

There are many conflicts around the world that involve violations of international law (e.g. the civil war in Syria). However, unlike in the national systems, there is no centralized world enforcer. Therefore, a question arises whether in the current state of affairs international law can be enforced. This chapter uses key theories of international relations (IR) to explain the problem of enforcement in the context of international law. In particular, the chapter focuses on three international institutions that play a role in the maintenance of global order: United Nations Security Council, International Court of Justice, and International Criminal Court. These institutions are analyzed from the perspective of IR theories to explain their emergence and functionality. Having different levels of impact on international law, all three institutions derive their authority from the States that delegate to them decision powers. Finally, the chapter offers some thoughts on the implications emerging powers have on the changing global order.

Keywords

Enforcement International law International relations theories Security council International court of justice International criminal court 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rotterdam Institute for Law and Economics (RILE), Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University RotterdamRotterdamThe Netherlands

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