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The Mechanism of QFIIs’ Institutional Activism in China

  • Wenge Wang
Chapter

Abstract

Shareholder activism, especially institutional activism, has spilled over from the US to Europe and elsewhere, changing the corporate governance landscape across the world. However, the extent of this change differs between countries, and styles of activism differ. In Europe, the American style of shareholder activism, and particularly the typical mechanism of the shareholder coalition or “wolf pack”, has not been seen to date. One reason for this is the difference in legal and regulatory environments. The same is true for other non-European countries such as China.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wenge Wang
    • 1
  1. 1.AnshanChina

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