Advertisement

Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment

  • Elena ParilinaEmail author
  • Artem Sedakov
Chapter
Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 280)

Abstract

We consider a finite horizon dynamic competition model in discrete time in which firms are not restricted from cooperation with each other and can form coalitions of any size. For every coalition of firms, we determine profits of its members by two approaches: without the redistribution of profits inside the coalition and with such redistribution using a solution from cooperative game theory. Next, for each approach we examine the stability of a coalition structure in the game. When we find a stable coalition structure, we then verify whether it is dynamically stable, that is, stable over time with respect to the same profit distribution method chosen in the initial time period.

Keywords

Dynamic competition Coalition structure Stability 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This research was supported by the Russian Science Foundation under grant No. 17-11-01079.

References

  1. Aumann, R. J., & Dreze, J. H. (1974). Cooperative games with coalition structures. International Journal of Game Theory, 3, 217–237.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Carlson, D. A., & Leitmann, G. (2005). The direct method for a class of infinite horizon dynamic games. In C. Deissenberg & R. F. Hartl (Eds.), Optimal control and dynamic games. Advances in computational management science (Vol. 7, pp. 319–334). Boston, MA: Springer.Google Scholar
  3. Carraro, C. (1999). The structure of international environmental agreements. In C. Carraro (Ed.), International environmental agreements on climate change. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Feem) series on economics, energy and environment (Vol. 13, pp. 9–26). Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Chander, P., & Tulkens, H. (1997). A core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities. International Journal of Game Theory, 26, 379–401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Haurie, A., Krawczyk, J. B., & Zaccour, G. (2012). Games and dynamic games. Singapore: Scientific World.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Parilina, E., & Sedakov, A. (2014). Stable bank cooperation for cost reduction problem. The Czech Economic Review, 8(1), 7–25Google Scholar
  7. Parilina, E., & Sedakov, A. (2015). Stochastic approach for determining stable coalition structure. International Game Theory Review, 17(4), 155009CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Rajan, R. (1989). Endogenous coalition formation in cooperative oligopolies. International Economic Review, 30(4), 863–876CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Sedakov, A., Parilina, E., Volobuev, Yu., & Klimuk, D. (2013). Existence of stable coalition structures in three-person games. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 6, 407–422.Google Scholar
  10. Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the theory of games (Vol. II, pp. 307–317). Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Sun, F., & Parilina, E. (2018). Existence of stable coalition structures in four-person games. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 11, 224–248.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Saint Petersburg State UniversitySaint PetersburgRussia

Personalised recommendations