An Approach to Indirect Doxastic Responsibility

  • Andrea Robitzsch
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 411)


In this chapter I will present an approach to doxastic responsibility that is based on indirect doxastic control.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrea Robitzsch
    • 1
  1. 1.University of OsnabrückOsnabrückGermany

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