Doxastic Responsibility and Direct Doxastic Control

  • Andrea Robitzsch
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 411)


The aim of this chapter is to argue that doxastic responsibility, i.e., responsibility for holding a certain doxastic attitude, is not based on direct doxastic control. There are two different kinds of direct doxastic control to be found in the literature, intentional doxastic control and evaluative doxastic control. Although many epistemologists agree that we do not have intentional doxastic control over our doxastic attitudes, it has been argued that we have evaluative doxastic control over the majority of our doxastic attitudes. This has led to the assumption that doxastic responsibility is based on evaluative doxastic control. In the first part of this chapter I will introduce the notion of doxastic responsibility and the framework of doxastic guidance control as well as the approaches to direct and indirect doxastic control. I will then argue that doxastic responsibility is not based on direct doxastic control by showing that doxastic responsibility is neither based on intentional nor on evaluative doxastic control.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrea Robitzsch
    • 1
  1. 1.University of OsnabrückOsnabrückGermany

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