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The nDTM Among Contemporaries

  • Paweł Grabarczyk
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 409)

Abstract

The chapter consists of two main parts. The first one can be seen as a counterpart to Chap.  3 in which the original directival theory was compared to classic theories of language. In the current chapter I compare the nDTM to three contemporary functional role semantics: Ned Block’s conceptual role semantics, Robert Brandom’s inferential role semantics and Jaroslav Peregrin’s rule theory of language. Analogously to the role of Chap.  3, this comparison helps me to embellish some of the unique features of the nDTM and position the theory on the contemporary philosophical map. In the second part of this chapter I return to the list of eighteen desiderata introduced in Chap.  2 and evaluate the nDTM by looking at which of these desiderata does the new theory fulfill.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of LodzIT University of CopenhagenLodzPoland

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