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The DTM Among Classic Theories

  • Paweł Grabarczyk
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 409)

Abstract

In this chapter I position the original DTM amongst four classic theories: Ferdinand de Saussure’s semiotics, Wifried Sellars’ theory of language, Quine’s behavioral theory of language and Davidson’s truth conditional semantics. I argue that some of the similarities and differences between the DTM and these theories help to understand distinctive features of Ajdukiewiczian account.

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Copyright information

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of LodzIT University of CopenhagenLodzPoland

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