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The Design of Everyday Markets

  • Nicole ImmorlicaEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)

Abstract

Economic design is based on a deep and instrumental theory of optimal strategic behavior. This approach, while highly valuable in complex economic environments involving sophisticated agents with clear objectives, sometimes results in design that is unintuitive to humans. This article promotes the study of everyday markets which are easy for humans to navigate. Such an agenda requires new interdisciplinary interactions and metrics of success.

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline, Jenn Wortman Vaughn, Glen Weyl and James Wright for many lovely conversations that inspired ideas in this piece. The main thesis of this work echoes that of Chen et al. (2016), which similarly emphasizes the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration and an extended set of tools and techniques for the field of social computing.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Microsoft ResearchCambridgeUSA

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