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New Directions of Study in Matching with Constraints

  • Fuhito KojimaEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)

Abstract

This piece surveys a recent body of studies in “matching with constraints.” It discusses relationship with traditional matching theory and new applications, and concludes with some open questions.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Stanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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