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The Present and Future of Judgement Aggregation Theory. A Law and Economics Perspective

  • Philippe MonginEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)

Abstract

This chapter briefly reviews the present state of judgment aggregation theory and tentatively suggests a future direction for that theory. In the review, we start by emphasizing the difference between the doctrinal paradox and the discursive dilemma, two idealized examples which classically serve to motivate the theory, and then proceed to reconstruct it as a brand of logical theory, unlike in some other interpretations, using a single impossibility theorem as a key to its technical development. In the prospective part, having mentioned existing applications to social choice theory and computer science, which we do not discuss here, we consider a potential application to law and economics. This would be based on a deeper exploration of the doctrinal paradox and its relevance to the functioning of collegiate courts. On this topic, legal theorists have provided empirical observations and theoretical hints that judgment aggregation theorists would be in a position to clarify and further elaborate. As a general message, the chapter means to suggest that the future of judgment aggregation theory lies with its applications rather than its internal theoretical development.

Keywords

Judgment aggregation theory Logical aggregation theory Law and economics Doctrinal paradox Discursive dilemma Canonical theorem of judgment aggregation theory Premiss-based versus conclusion-based method Collegiate courts Issue-based versus case-based adjudication method 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CNRS & HEC ParisJouy-en-JosasFrance

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