Robust Mechanism Design: An Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium Perspective
In this short essay, I revisit the idea of robust mechanism design explicitly taking into account that it may be hard to access the beliefs held by agents in previous plays of the mechanism. I propose modelling such an environment using the apparatus of the analogy-based expectation equilibrium with payoff-relevant analogy partitions. Such an approach allows to move away from impossibility results that arise with ex post implementation.
I thank Jean-François Laslier for useful comments and the ERC (grant no 742816) for funding.
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