On “Going Unstructured” in Bargaining Experiments

  • Emin KaragözoğluEmail author
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)


This chapter focuses on the role of experiments in guiding theorists and policymakers working on design issues in negotiations. More specifically, our focus will be on unstructured bargaining experiments. I argue that the experimental research on bargaining should gradually shift focus from highly structured and simplified bargaining experiments to more unstructured bargaining experiments. Our supporting arguments will be based on experimental findings from bargaining and surplus sharing experiments, theoretical developments in bargaining research and behavioral economics, computerization of economic experiments, improved ability to conduct online experiments with large subject pools, and the recent developments in data science and econometrics.



I would like to thank Nick Feltovich, Werner Güth, and Jean-François Laslier for helpful comments.


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsBilkent UniversityÇankaya, AnkaraTurkey
  2. 2.CESifoMunichGermany

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