The Queueing Problem and Its Generalizations
A group of agents must be served in a facility. The facility can serve one agent at a time and agents incur waiting costs. The queueing problem is concerned with finding the order to serve agents and the monetary transfers they should receive. In this paper, we summarize recent developments in the queueing problem and discuss its possible generalizations to indicate the directions for future research.
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