The Division of Scarce Resources

  • Christopher P. Chambers
  • Juan D. Moreno-TerneroEmail author
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)


We explore possible future lines of research for the focal problem of dividing scarce resources. They refer to addressing dynamic aspects of these problems, their multidimensional extensions (with, possibly, the existence of mixed resources, heterogeneous preferences and negative awards), uncertainty, and the ensuing incentive aspects in the division process.



We thank Gustavo Berganti\({\tilde{\text{ n }}}\)os for comments and suggestions. Mereno-Ternero acknowledges financial support from FEDER/Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades-Agencia Estatal de Investigación [Research Project ECO2017-83069-P].


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christopher P. Chambers
    • 1
  • Juan D. Moreno-Ternero
    • 2
    Email author
  1. 1.Georgetown UniversityWashingtonUSA
  2. 2.Universidad Pablo de OlavideSevillaSpain

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