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How Can We Model Emotional and Behavioral Dynamics in Collective Decision Making?

  • Jörg RotheEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)

Abstract

In common models of collective decision making, such as voting and fair division, most of the previous work has been concerned with static, complete-information settings only. As an interesting task for the future, it is proposed to model collective decision making more dynamically and by taking into account how the agents’ preferences and behavior evolve over time and based on their emotions.

Notes

Acknowledgements

I thank Umberto Grandi and Bill Zwicker for helpful comments. This work was supported in part by DFG grants RO 1202/14-2 and RO 1202/15-1.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für InformatikHeinrich-Heine-Universität DüsseldorfDüsseldorfGermany

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