On the Axiomatics of Resource Allocation: Classifying Axioms and Mapping Out Promising Directions

  • William ThomsonEmail author
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)


The purpose of this note is to propose a two-way classification of the axioms of the theory of economic design, and to map out directions for future research that we perceive as particularly promising.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of RochesterRochesterUSA

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