Advertisement

Camels, Dummy, and the Importance of Context

  • Étienne Billette de Villemeur
  • Justin LerouxEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)

Abstract

Economic design problems are more successful in garnering support from practitioners when the axioms are relevant to the practical context. We use the well-known Dummy axiom as a concentrated example of several ways in which axioms can fail to be meaningful in practice. We then describe two channels through which characterization results using axioms that are not relevant to a specific context can undermine the axiomatic program, both from an internal (theoretical) standpoint and from its relationship with the practical world. Yet, a great deal of intellectual stimulation can be found in disciplining ourselves to be guided by context, despite the theorist’s traditional leaning towards universality.

References

  1. Abdul-Rauf, M. (1996). Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib: The First Intellectual Muslim Thinker (p. 106). Alexandria: Al-Saadawi Publications.Google Scholar
  2. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003). School choice: A mechanism design approach. American Economic Review, 93(3), 729–747.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2009). Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the NYC high school match. American Economic Review, 99(5), 1954–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Kesten, O. (2010). School choice with consent. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(3), 1297–1348.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Moulin, H. (2002). Axiomatic cost and surplus-sharing. In K. J. Arrow, A. Sen, & K. Suzumura (Eds.), The handbook of social choice and welfare. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
  6. Moulin, H., & Vohra, R. (2003). Characterization of additive cost sharing methods. Economics Letters, 80(3), 399–407.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., & Utku Ünver, M. (2004). Kidney exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2), 457–488.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., & Utku Ünver, M. (2007). Efficient kidney exchange: Coincidence of wants in a markets with compatibility-based preferences. American Economic Review, 97(3), 828–851.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Schummer, J., & Abizada, A. (2017). Incentives in landing slot problems. Journal of Economic Theory, 170, 29–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Schummer, J., & Serizawa, S. (2019). The Role of Characterizations in Market Design. [This volume].Google Scholar
  11. Schummer, J., & Vohra, R. V. (2013). Assignment of arrival slots. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(2), 164–185.Google Scholar
  12. Wang, Y. T. (1999). The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model. Economic Letters, 64, 187–192.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Étienne Billette de Villemeur
    • 1
  • Justin Leroux
    • 2
    • 3
    • 4
    Email author
  1. 1.Université de Lille and LEM-CNRS (UMR 9221)Villeneuve d’Ascq CedexFrance
  2. 2.HEC MontréalMontrealCanada
  3. 3.CIRANOMontrealCanada
  4. 4.CRÉMontrealCanada

Personalised recommendations