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Reliable Rowhammer Attack and Mitigation Based on Reverse Engineering Memory Address Mapping Algorithms

  • Saeyoung Oh
  • Jong KimEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11402)

Abstract

Rowhammer attacks intentionally induce bit flips to corrupt victim’s data whose integrity must be guaranteed. To perform sophisticated rowhammer attacks, attackers need to repeatedly access the neighboring rows of target data. In DRAM, however, the physical addresses of neighboring rows are not always contiguous even if they are located before or after a target row. Hence, it is important to know the mapping algorithm which maps between physical addresses and physical row indexes not only for an attack but also for protection.

In this paper, we introduce a method to reverse engineer the exact mapping algorithm and demonstrate that the assumption in previous rowhammer work is faulty. In addition, we introduce a novel and efficient rowhammer method and improve existing mitigations that has a security hole caused by the faulty assumption. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed attack and show that the proposed mitigation almost perfectly defends against rowhammer attacks.

Keywords

Rowhammer bug Reverse engineer Memory address mapping 

Notes

Acknowledgement

This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIP) (No. 2017R1A2B4010914).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and EngineeringPohang University of Science and Technology (POSTECH)PohangRepublic of Korea

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