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Factoring Products of Braids via Garside Normal Form

  • Simon-Philipp MerzEmail author
  • Christophe Petit
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11443)

Abstract

Braid groups are infinite non-abelian groups naturally arising from geometric braids. For two decades they have been proposed for cryptographic use. In braid group cryptography public braids often contain secret braids as factors and it is hoped that rewriting the product of braid words hides individual factors. We provide experimental evidence that this is in general not the case and argue that under certain conditions parts of the Garside normal form of factors can be found in the Garside normal form of their product. This observation can be exploited to decompose products of braids of the form ABC when only B is known.

Our decomposition algorithm yields a universal forgery attack on WalnutDSATM, which is one of the 20 proposed signature schemes that are being considered by NIST for standardization of quantum-resistant public-key cryptography. Our attack on WalnutDSATM can universally forge signatures within seconds for both the 128-bit and 256-bit security level, given one random message-signature pair. The attack worked on 99.8% and 100% of signatures for the 128-bit and 256-bit security levels in our experiments.

Furthermore, we show that the decomposition algorithm can be used to solve instances of the conjugacy search problem and decomposition search problem in braid groups. These problems are at the heart of other cryptographic schemes based on braid groups.

Notes

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Ward Beullens and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback. This work was produced as part of a master’s thesis of the first author at the University of Oxford. He is now supported by the EPSRC as part of the Centre for Doctoral Training in Cyber Security at Royal Holloway, University of London (EP/P009301/1).

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Royal Holloway, University of LondonEghamUK
  2. 2.University of BirminghamBirminghamUK

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