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Non-interactive Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials

  • Geoffroy CouteauEmail author
  • Michael Reichle
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11442)

Abstract

Anonymous credential (\(\mathsf {AC}\)) schemes are protocols which allow for authentication of authorized users without compromising their privacy. Of particular interest are non-interactive anonymous credential (\(\mathsf {NIAC}\)) schemes, where the authentication process only requires the user to send a single message that still conceals its identity. Unfortunately, all known \(\mathsf {NIAC}\) schemes in the standard model require pairing based cryptography, which limits them to a restricted set of specific assumptions and requires expensive pairing computations. The notion of keyed-verification anonymous credential (\(\mathsf {KVAC}\)) was introduced in (Chase et al., CCS’14) as an alternative to standard anonymous credential schemes allowing for more efficient instantiations; yet, making existing \(\mathsf {KVAC}\) non-interactive either requires pairing-based cryptography, or the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.

In this work, we construct the first non-interactive keyed-verification anonymous credential (\(\mathsf {NIKVAC}\)) system in the standard model, without pairings. Our scheme is efficient, attribute-based, supports multi-show unlinkability, and anonymity revocation. We achieve this by building upon a combination of algebraic \(\mathsf {MAC}\) with the recent designated-verifier non-interactive zero-knowledge (\(\mathsf {DVNIZK}\)) proof of knowledge of (Couteau and Chaidos, Eurocrypt’18). Toward our goal of building \(\mathsf {NIKVAC}\), we revisit the security analysis of a \(\mathsf {MAC}\) scheme introduced in (Chase et al., CCS’14), strengthening its guarantees, and we introduce the notion of oblivious non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system, where the prover can generate non-interactive proofs for statements that he cannot check by himself, having only a part of the corresponding witness, and where the proof can be checked efficiently given the missing part of the witness. We provide an efficient construction of an oblivious \(\mathsf {DVNIZK}\), building upon the specific properties of the \(\mathsf {DVNIZK}\) proof system of (Couteau and Chaidos, Eurocrypt’18).

Keywords

Anonymous credentials Keyed-verification anonymous credentials Non-interactive anonymous credentials Designated-verifier non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs 

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Karlsruhe Institute of TechnologyKarlsruheGermany

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