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The Challenges of Cyber Deterrence

  • Mariarosaria TaddeoEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Digital Ethics Lab Yearbook book series (DELY)

Abstract

In this chapter, I analyse deterrence theory and argue that its applicability to cyberspace is limited and that these limits are not trivial. They are the consequence of fundamental differences between deterrence theory and the nature of cyber conflicts and cyberspace. The goals of this analysis are to identify the limits of deterrence theory in cyberspace, clear the ground of inadequate approaches to cyber deterrence, and define the conceptual space for a domain-specific theory of cyber deterrence, still to be developed.

Keywords

Cyberspace Cyber conflicts Defence Deterrence Retaliations State Stability 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Oxford Internet Institute, Digital Ethics LabUniversity of OxfordOxfordUK
  2. 2.The Alan Turing InstituteLondonUK

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