Normalized Equilibrium in Tullock Rent Seeking Game

  • Eitan AltmanEmail author
  • Mandar Datar
  • Gerard Burnside
  • Corinne Touati
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 277)


Games with Common Coupled Constraints represent many real-life situations. In these games, if one player fails to satisfy its constraints common to other players, then the other players are also penalized. Therefore these games can be viewed as being cooperative in goals related to meeting the common constraints, and non-cooperative in terms of the utilities. We study in this paper the Tullock rent-seeking game with additional common coupled constraints. We have succeeded in showing that the utilities satisfy the property of diagonal strict concavity (DSC), which can be viewed as an extension of concavity to a game setting. It not only guarantees the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium but also of the normalized equilibrium.


Normalized equilibrium Common Coupled Constraints Diagonal strict concavity 


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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eitan Altman
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
    Email author
  • Mandar Datar
    • 1
    • 2
  • Gerard Burnside
    • 1
    • 3
  • Corinne Touati
    • 1
  1. 1.Joint Lab of INRIA and Nokia Bell-LabsParisFrance
  2. 2.Laboratoire Informatique d’AvignonUniversity of AvignonAvignonFrance
  3. 3.Laboratory of Information, Networking and Communication Sciences (LINCS)ParisFrance

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