The Economics of Bundling Content with Unlicensed Wireless Service

  • Yining ZhuEmail author
  • Haoran Yu
  • Randall Berry
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 277)


Adding new unlicensed wireless spectrum is a promising approach to accommodate increasing traffic demand. However, unlicensed spectrum may have a high risk of becoming congested, and service providers (SPs) may have difficulty to differentiate their wireless services when offering them on the same unlicensed spectrum. When SPs offer identical services, the resulting competition can lead to zero profits. In this work, we consider the case where an SP bundles its wireless service with a content service. We show that this can differentiate the SPs’ services and lead to positive SP profits. In particular, we study the characteristics of the content services that an SP should bundle with its wireless service, and analyze the impact of bundling on consumer surplus.


Unlicensed spectrum market Game theory Bundling 


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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA

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