Using Bankruptcy Rules to Allocate CO2 Emission Permits

  • Raja TrabelsiEmail author
  • Stefano Moretti
  • Saoussen Krichen
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 277)


The global growth of technologies and production affects the climate through emissions of greenhouse gases. The total amount of countries’ demands of CO2 emissions permits is higher than what the planet can sustain. This situation can be considered as a bankruptcy problem, where the sum of players’ claims exceeds the endowment of the resource. In this paper, we use an approach based on bankruptcy solutions (in particular, on the Weighted Constrained Equal Awards rule) in order to propose a more efficient and fair allocation protocol for sharing CO2 emissions permits among the EU-28 countries.


Bankruptcy situations Weighted Constrained Equal Awards CO2 emissions Cooperative games 


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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Raja Trabelsi
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
    Email author
  • Stefano Moretti
    • 2
  • Saoussen Krichen
    • 3
  1. 1.LAMSADE and LARODECParisFrance
  2. 2.Universite Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University, CNRS, LAMSADEParis Cedex 16France
  3. 3.LARODEC, Institut Superieur de Gestion de TunisUniversity of TunisTunisTunisia

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