Jamming in Multiple Independent Gaussian Channels as a Game

  • Michail FasoulakisEmail author
  • Apostolos Traganitis
  • Anthony Ephremides
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 277)


We study the problem of jamming in multiple independent Gaussian channels as a zero-sum game. We show that in the unique Nash equilibrium of the game the best-response strategy of the transmitter is the waterfilling to the sum of the jamming and the noise power in each channel and the best-response strategy of the jammer is the waterfilling only to the noise power.


Wireless communications Jamming Zero-sum game Gaussian channels 


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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michail Fasoulakis
    • 1
    Email author
  • Apostolos Traganitis
    • 1
    • 2
  • Anthony Ephremides
    • 3
  1. 1.Institute of Computer Science, Foundation for Research and Technology-Hellas (ICS-FORTH)HeraklionGreece
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of CreteHeraklionGreece
  3. 3.Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Institute for Systems ResearchUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkUSA

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