Efficient Framework for Detection of Version Number Attack in Internet of Things

  • Rashmi SahayEmail author
  • G. Geethakumari
  • Barsha Mitra
  • Ipsit Sahoo
Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 941)


The vision of the Internet of Things (IoT) is to connect minimal embedded devices to the Internet. The constrained nature of these embedded devices makes the use of Internet Protocol impossible in its native form to establish global connectivity. To resolve this, IETF proposed 6LOWPAN, the wireless internet for embedded devices, which makes use of RPL as its routing protocol. RPL organizes low power and lossy networks in the form of one or more Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graphs (DODAGs). Each DODAG is assigned a version number. The purpose of the version number is to ensure that there are loop free paths to the root node, the routing table entries of nodes in the DODAG are not obsolete and there is no inconsistency in the DODAG. The root node in a DODAG increments the version number in case of any inconsistency. This calls for a global repair process and the DAG is reconstructed. A malicious node may advertise a false version number in its control message to force a global repair. In this paper, we propose an efficient framework for detecting version number attacks in the IoT. We also present mechanisms to detect the attack and identify the malicious nodes instigating the version number attack.


IoT 6LOWPAN RPL Version number attack Attack detection 


  1. 1.
    Kushalnagar, N., Montenegro, G., Schumacher, C.: IPv6 over low-power wireless personal area networks (6LoWPANs). Accessed Nov 2016
  2. 2.
    Winter, T., Thubert, P., Brandt, A., Hui, J., Kelsey, R., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur, J.P., Alexander, R.: RPL: IPv6 routing protocol for low-power and lossy networks. Accessed Dec 2016
  3. 3.
    Mayzaud, A., Badonnel, R., Chrisment, I.: A taxonomy of attacks in RPL-based internet of things. Int. J. Netw. Secur. 18(3), 459–473 (2016)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Wallgren, L., Raza, S., Voigt, T.: Routing attacks and countermeasures in the RPL-based internet of things. Int. J. Distrib. Sens. Netw. 2013, 1–11 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Dhumane, A., Prasad, R., Prasad, J.: Routing issues in internet of things: a survey. In: Proceedings of the International Multi Conference of Engineers and Computer Scientists, 16–18 March 2016 (2016)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Tsao, T., Alexander, R., Dohler, M., Daza, V., Lozano, A., Richardson, M.: A security threat analysis for the routing protocol for low-power and lossy networks (RPLs). Accessed April 2017
  7. 7.
    Thubert, P.: Objective function zero for the routing protocol for low-power and lossy networks (RPL). Accessed April 2017
  8. 8.
    Vasseur, J.P., Kim, M., Pister, K., Dejean, N., Barthel, D.: Routing metrics used for path calculation in low-power and lossy networks. Accessed April 2017
  9. 9.
    Barbir, A., Murphy, S., Yang, Y.: Generic threats to routing protocols. Accessed Jan 2018
  10. 10.
    Mayzaud, A., Sehgal, A., Badonnel, R., Chrisment, I., Schönwälder, J.: A study of RPL DODAG version attacks. In: IFIP International Conference on Autonomous Infrastructure, Management and Security, 30 June 2014, pp. 92–104 (2014)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Aris, A., Oktug, S.F., Yalcin, S.B.: RPL version number attacks: in-depth study. In: IEEE Symposium in Network Operations and Management Symposium (NOMS), 25 April 2016, pp. 776–779 (2016)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Dvir, A., Buttyan, L.: VeRA-version number and rank authentication in RPL. In: IEEE 8th International Conference on Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems (MASS), 17 October 2011, pp. 709–714 (2011)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Mayzaud, A., Badonnel, R., Chrisment, I.: A distributed monitoring strategy for detecting version number attacks in RPL-based networks. IEEE Trans. Netw. Serv. Manag. 14(2), 472–86 (2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. 14.
    Osterlind, F., Dunkels, A., Eriksson, J., Finne, N., Voigt, T.: Cross-level sensor network simulation with COOJA. In: 31st IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks, 14 November 2006, pp. 641–648 (2006)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rashmi Sahay
    • 1
    Email author
  • G. Geethakumari
    • 1
  • Barsha Mitra
    • 1
  • Ipsit Sahoo
    • 1
  1. 1.BITS-Pilani Hyderabad CampusHyderabadIndia

Personalised recommendations