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Trade-offs in Protecting Keccak Against Combined Side-Channel and Fault Attacks

  • Antoon PurnalEmail author
  • Victor Arribas
  • Lauren De Meyer
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11421)

Abstract

When deployed in a potentially hostile environment, security-critical devices are susceptible to physical attacks. Consequently, cryptographic implementations need to be protected against side-channel analysis, fault attacks and attacks that combine both approaches. CAPA (CRYPTO 2018) is an algorithm-level combined countermeasure, based on MPC, with provable security in a strong attacker model. A key challenge for combined countermeasures, and CAPA in particular, is the implementation cost. In this work, we use CAPA to obtain the first hardware implementations of Keccak (SHA-3) with resistance against combined side-channel and fault attacks. We systematically explore the speed-area trade-off and show that CAPA, in spite of its algorithmic overhead, can be very fast or reasonably small. In fact, for the standardized Keccak-f[1600] instance, our low-latency version is nearly twice as fast as the previous implementations that only consider side-channel security, at the cost of area and randomness consumption. For all four presented designs, the protection level for side-channel and fault attacks can be scaled separately and to arbitrary order. To evaluate the physical security, we assess the side-channel leakage of a representative second-order secure implementation on FPGA. In addition, we experimentally validate the claimed fault detection probability.

Keywords

Side-channel analysis Fault attacks Masking Combined countermeasure Keccak SHA-3 CAPA 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the COSADE reviewers for their helpful comments. This work was supported in part by the Research Council KU Leuven: C16/15/058 and by the NIST Research Grant 60NANB15D346. Lauren De Meyer is funded by a PhD fellowship of the Fund for Scientific Research - Flanders (FWO). Antoon Purnal would like to thank Vincent Rijmen and Ingrid Verbauwhede for supervising the master’s thesis that led to this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Antoon Purnal
    • 1
    Email author
  • Victor Arribas
    • 1
  • Lauren De Meyer
    • 1
  1. 1.KU Leuven, imec - COSICLeuvenBelgium

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