Development Versus Democracy? The CPEC and Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

  • Siegfried O. Wolf
Part of the Contemporary South Asian Studies book series (CSAS)


Pakistan’s unhealthy civil-military relations constitute as a major hindrance for sustainable development and democratic consolidation in the country. This chapter will outline the basic determinants of civil-military relations in Pakistan—with special reference to the democracy-development nexus. By applying the concept of embedded democracy and a derived notion of civilian control, it will be argued that the establishment of the CPEC will lead to a further weakening of civilian decision-making powers vis-á-vis the military. Furthermore, it will be pointed out that the CPEC implementation and its respective security requirements created an environment in which the military could legally build-up a far-reaching institutionalized, formal role in the political-administrative system. The subsequent seizing of power by the armed forces will have severe impacts on the quality of democracy in Pakistan.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Siegfried O. Wolf
    • 1
  1. 1.South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF)BrusselsBelgium

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